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Responsibility sharing in the field of migration and asylum has become one of the
most contentious issues within the European Union (EU). Southern European
countries claim that the current system – based on the Dublin-Schengen duo – is
fundamentally unbalanced, as they end up bearing the main responsibilities in terms
of both border and migration control, and asylum seekers’ reception and protection.
These claims are linked to calls either for more European integration and solidarity or
for an enhancement of national sovereignty.
Despite tensions between these different stances, there has been a practical
convergence in the response to the 2015 so-called “migration crisis”. The EU and its
member states have decided to move from the externalisation of migration control
to the externalisation of protection responsibilities. They have promoted the shifting
(rather than sharing) of the “asylum burden” further south – i.e. from southern
European countries to third countries in the EU’s southern neighbourhood or in the
Global South.
This goal has been pursued through recourse to informal migration cooperation
agreements – and in particular through the incorporation of the safe third country
(STC) and first country of asylum (FCA) concepts into these deals, which allows
member states to shift to third countries the responsibility for examining asylum
applications and providing protection.
Indeed, cooperation on migration management has been recently characterised by a
process of “informalisation”, most prominently in relation to readmission, which saw
the proliferation of informal agreements of a dubious legal nature – particularly from
a rule of law perspective. This expansion has been two-fold. First, the use of informal
agreements has expanded from the national level to the EU level. Second, the
informalisation of cooperation with third countries has extended to include not only
migration and border management, but also asylum management. This post aims to
analyse both expansive shifts, highlighting their impact on international responsibility
sharing mechanisms and the protection of asylum seekers’ fundamental rights.
The EU’s Shift Towards Informalisation
European countries have a long history of bilateral cooperation with countries
of origin and transit in the area of migration, border control and readmission,
established since the nineties through both traditional international treaties and
informal arrangements. Conversely, with migration and asylum becoming an
area of shared competence further to the changes introduced by the Treaty of
Amsterdam in 1999 – including the external dimension of migration policy-making
– the EU started focusing on the negotiation of traditional international treaties with
third countries, especially EU readmission agreements (EURAs). However, the
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relatively limited results achieved in practice and the desire to have more effective
forms of cooperation with countries of origin and transit, especially in the southern
neighbourhood, has led to an increased reliance on informal migration deals also at
EU level. Following the example and building upon the experience of some member
states, the Commission has increasingly promoted the recourse to non-traditional
instruments of cooperation to substitute, complement, integrate or set the bases for
formal agreements, with the purpose to make cooperation on migration management
work in practice.
The first signs of the EU’s shift towards non-traditional instruments of cooperation,
particularly with Mediterranean countries, emerged after the 2011 Arab uprisings,
when the EU resorted to Mobility Partnerships as an instrument to establish
cooperation on migration management with North African countries, rather than
pushing forward with EURAs negotiations. However, this informalisation trend
became evident and widespread following the 2015 “migration crisis”. Since the
adoption of the European Agenda on Migration in May 2015, Commission and
Council official policy documents have increasingly acknowledged (and explicitly
politically validated) a new cooperation strategy with third countries based on
informal agreements, working arrangements and political dialogue rather than
traditional international agreements.
The Commission Communication on an EU Action Plan on Return of September
2015 marked a radical change in the Commission’s approach to readmission.
Without neglecting the importance of formal EURAs, the document focuses on the
improvement of operational cooperation on a practical (even bilateral) level and
the use of political dialogue and other policy instruments to obtain more from third
countries. But the most clear and explicit acknowledgment of a shift towards informal
cooperation is included in the Council Conclusions on the Expulsion of Illegally
Staying Third-Country Nationals of 11 May 2016. Here, the Council affirmed that,
in addition to readmission agreements, legally non-binding working arrangements on
identification, return and readmission could be established with third countries at EU
level, pertaining in particular to own nationals and including the holding of regular,
informal meetings at expert level to review implementation and address possible
obstacles.
In its Communication on Establishing a New Partnership Framework with Third
Countries of 7 June 2016, the Commission confirmed the approach promoted by the
Council and reaffirmed that “the paramount priority is to achieve fast and operational
returns, and not necessarily formal readmission agreements”. The New Partnership
Framework represented a milestone for the EU external migration policy and clearly
marked the “informal turn” of the EU cooperation policies in the area of migration, in
particular (but not exclusively) towards African countries.
Under the umbrella of the New Partnership Framework, various types of informal
arrangements have been negotiated and concluded at the EU level – including
the Joint Declaration on Ghana-EU Cooperation on Migration (2016), the Joint
Way Forward on Migration Issues between Afghanistan and the EU (2016), and
the Standard Operating Procedures between the EU and Bangladesh for the
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Identification and Return of Persons without Authorisation to Stay (2017). Moreover,
the Commission has concluded a number of informal readmission agreements –
relabeled as Good Practices for the Efficient Operation of the Return Procedure –
with several sub-Saharan countries, including Guinea (2017) and Ethiopia, Gambia
and Ivory Coast (2018).
The Commission has been very careful to always mention in its policy documents
and in the text of the arrangements that these are “non-legally binding” instruments.
The purpose is to differentiate them from formal international treaties, whose
adoption would require following the procedure set out by Article 218 TFEU,
including the democratic scrutiny of the European Parliament.
From Migration Management to Asylum
Management: Labelling a Third Country as “Safe”
Since the 2015 “migration crisis”, the EU and its member states have tried to
outsource to third countries the responsibility not only over border and migration
control but also over readmitting asylum seekers, examining asylum applications,
providing reception and protection to forced migrants. This additional externalisation
objective is mainly pursued through the recourse to informal agreements. While
formal readmission agreements can only apply to unauthorised migrants and can
never apply to asylum seekers, informal agreements tend to associate different legal
statuses – including potential beneficiaries of international protection – to a single
catch-all category of “migrants not having the right to enter the EU”.
An emblematic example of the expansion of the scope of EU informal deals from
migration management to asylum management is the EU-Turkey Statement of 18
March 2016. Under this notorious deal, readmission applies to everyone crossing
over from Turkey to the Greek islands – a majority being Syrian and Afghan asylum
seekers. The people targeted and actually affected by the implementation of this
agreement, therefore, are mainly persons who try to reach the EU to seek protection,
rather than irregular migrants or rejected asylum seekers.
The readmission to Turkey of persons who would probably qualify as beneficiaries
of international protection in Europe is possible (and deemed compatible with EU
and international law) based on the controversial assumption that Turkey is a “safe
country” for them. This assumption is grounded on the application of the concepts of
“safe third country” (STC) or “first country of asylum” (FCA) as set out, respectively,
by Article 38 and Article 35 of the Asylum Procedures Directive (APD).
However, as argued in the analysis “Why Turkey in Not a ‘Safe Country’”, Turkey
could hardly be considered a STC, for a number of reasons – most notably because
under the Turkish legal framework on asylum it is not possible for a non-European
asylum seeker to request refugee status, be recognised as a refugee, and receive
protection in accordance with the Geneva Convention. Conversely, Turkey could be
considered a FCA based on the APD definition, because it does foresee alternative
forms of protection for non-European asylum seekers – i.e. a so-called “conditional”
refugee status or subsidiary protection for non-European asylum seekers and a
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special “temporary protection” for Syrians. Nonetheless, Greek authorities need to
determine through an individual assessment of each applicant’s case whether the
protection granted by Turkey qualifies as sufficient. Article 35 APD does not provide
a definition of “sufficient protection”; it simply requires that the person concerned
benefits from the principle of non-refoulement – which is not always respected by
Turkey, as repeatedly reported by NGOs. Still, UNHCR argued that it follows from
the text, context, object and purpose of Article 35 that “sufficient protection” goes
well beyond protection from refoulement.
Following the EU-Turkey Statement, European leaders have often referred to that
agreement as a model that could be replicated with countries in North Africa in
order to stem migration across the Central Mediterranean route. The EU and some
member states have actually engaged in negotiating (in a more or less public and
transparent way) similar deals with countries like Tunisia, Libya and Egypt.
Interestingly, in its attempts to outsource the “asylum burden” to non-European
countries, the EU is pursuing a dual strategy. On the one hand, it seeks to negotiate
an externalisation of asylum responsibilities by means of informal agreements, in
order to facilitate states that may have an interest in cooperating but are reluctant
to commit to a strict international regulatory framework. On the other hand, the
EU seeks to provide a legally sound legitimacy to the externalisation of protection
responsibilities, by trying to incorporate the legal concepts of safe country of origin,
safe third country and first country of asylum in these informal deals.
There seems to be a tension between, on the one hand, the need to secure a
deal through an instrument which allows to avoid the formalities that are typical
of international agreements, and on the other hand, the need to provide a formal
legal basis to the responsibility-shifting mechanism that the informal deal aims
to establish. Perhaps, by providing a legal validation to such burden-shifting
mechanisms, European decision-makers aim to both make them acceptable to the
public opinion, and avoid they are struck out by EU or international courts.
The Impact of Informal Agreements on International
Responsibility Sharing
The most recent (and worrying) trend in the EU’s externalisation strategy consists
in negotiating with third countries informal deals, which aim to prevent asylum
seekers from entering the territory of the EU and delegate third countries to provide
protection. We are witnessing an extension of extraterritorial exclusion, political
distancing and the deferral of moral responsibility, with asylum seekers at the edges
of the EU being funneled to more dangerous and remote locations outside the
EU. This raises profound questions over the appropriateness, effectiveness and
desirability from a human rights perspective of the EU’s responses to the “migration
crisis”.
The increasing use of informal agreements on the part of both the EU and its
member states has contributed to move cooperation on migration management away
from international agreements, eschewing the oversight of democratic institutions,
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judicial authorities and public opinion. Typically, recourse to informal instruments of
cooperation has been justified through an emergency rhetoric, which linked these
instruments to an alleged “crisis” – as in the case of the EU-Turkey Statement.
However, in this and other cases, the forced return not only of irregular migrants
but also of potential asylum seekers to the country of origin or transit is carried out
without a proper consideration of the capacity de iure and de facto of the country
concerned to protect the fundamental rights of returnees.
There is an urge to investigate the human rights implications of the EU’s increased
reliance on externalisation tools operating in the shadow of the law and, more
worryingly, eschewing the rule of law. Furthermore, informal migration agreements
have the potential to jeopardize the international protection regime as a whole. In
particular, by shifting the “asylum burden” to third countries, informal deals risk to
perpetuate or exacerbate the already unbalanced distribution of refugees between
the Global South and the Global North.
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